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The proposed Directive on criminal law sanctions against insider dealing and market
manipulation (referred to as market abuse) offers the first test case of the boundaries of
the new criminal law competence provision of art.83(2) TFEU. The proposed Directive is
accompanied by a proposal for a Regulation, based on art.114 TFEU, which also aims to
fight market abuse albeit by the use of administrative sanctions. This contribution
considers the feasibility of the current EU regime against market abuse and thereby
discusses the legal basis of the proposed instruments as well as delicate questions raised
by these measures.
Introduction
The Commission’s recent proposal for a Directive3 on criminal sanctions for insider dealing
and market manipulation (referred to as market abuse) offers the first example of use of
art.83(2) TFEU, the ’’extended’’competence clause for ’’harmonisation’’of an area which is
essential for the effective implementation of EU law and where harmonisation measures
have already been adopted.The rationale for the proposed Directive, which is to be read in
conjunction with the proposed Regulation4 on insider dealing and market manipulation, is
to ensure market integrity and enhance public confidence in securities and derivatives.The
measures will, if adopted, supersede the 2003 Market Abuse Directive (MAD).5
The proposed instruments raise some intriguing issues. First, the question arises as to the
feasibility of criminal law to secure the integrity of the market at all. Secondly, the issue of
the adequacy of the legal basis for the proposed instruments as well as the desirability of
doublemeasures in this area needs to be considered. And, thirdly, the issue of fundamental
rights protection and the increased preventive focus as witnessed particularly with regard
to the Regulation and its far-reaching requirements for the Member States to have
surveillance mechanisms in place must be addressed.
What is groundbreaking with respect to the initiatives is that the proposed Directive
creates a new framework for the purposes of fighting crime while it regroups the
previous MAD regime into a separate Regulation to increase the effectiveness of the
system. The proposed Directive is a prime example of the invocation of criminal law to
guarantee effectiveness of European policies in this area. This reflection piece will
discuss the legal basis of the proposed Directive and Regulation. In addition, the article
considers the desirability of double measures, that is, both a Directive and a Regulation
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aimed at the same goal to fight irregularities in the market in order to increase market
integrity in this area.
The article will proceed as follows. After a very brief reiteration of the main changes
brought about by the LisbonTreaty and the previous lack of criminal law competence in
the European Union, the article discusses the history of the EU legislative framework
against market manipulation and insider dealing. The article then moves on to look at the
peculiarities of the new competence in art.83(2) TFEU and the question of when
harmonisation of criminal law is needed for the effective implementation of EU law.
Subsequently, the article investigates the proposed Regulation and discusses delicate
questions raised by this instrument with regard to fair trial guarantees. The article then
turns to the Commission’s recent communication on the coherence and effectiveness of
European criminal law and asks to what extent the Commission lives up to this promise in
the proposed measures under consideration.6
Financial crimes and EU law
Theproposed Directive and Regulationwere not created in a vacuumbut should be seen in
the light of thehistory of the debate on themarket abuse regime and thequestion as towhy
the suppression of financial crimes is relevant in EU law. Indeed, financial crimes together
with organised crime have since the early days of the EuropeanUnion constituted themain
criminal law threat to the establishment of the internalmarket and have, until 9/11when the
fight against terrorism became a higher priority, formed the core of the European Union’s
approach to criminal law.7 After all, criminal law was not really of interest for the EU
legislator unless it was needed as a tool for managing the internal market. Added to this,
there was of course no explicit supranational legislative competence for the European
Union in criminal law matters prior to the Lisbon Treaty. Yet, given the economic nature
of the internal market, it was often argued that the fight against financial crimes was a
legitimate objective for the European Union even before the extended competences
granted by the LisbonTreaty.8
The fight against EU financial crimes has traditionally takenplacewithin the frameworkof
the market creation provision of art.114 TFEU where the aim has been to increase investor
confidence.Through this legal web, the European Union relied on administrative sanctions
in the suppression of, for example, money laundering and the financing of terrorism.9
Nevertheless, theTampere Conclusions of 1999,10 the outcome of a special summit held
by the European Council devoted to Justice and Home Affairs issues,11 had already
underlined the necessity of taking action more fiercely within the financial crime sphere
by singling out money laundering and corruption as crimes deserving special attention at
EU level. This objective was later taken a step further with the Stockholm Programme,12
which seeks to improve the prosecution of tax evasion and corruption in the private sector
and the early detection of fraudulent market abuse as well as themisappropriationof funds.
The Stockholm Programme is the most recently adopted Justice and Home Affairs
agenda. It represents an important step in the direction of ’’more’’ criminal law at EU level
and should be viewed in the context of the entry into force of the LisbonTreaty, through
which the question of EU criminal law competences was partially solved. Criminal law as a
European policy area forms part of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ)
chapter in Title V of the TFEU. Of particular importance here is art.83(1) TFEU, which
concerns the regulation of substantive criminal law and stipulates that the European
Parliament and the Council may establish minimum rules in directives concerning the
definition of criminal law offences and sanctions in the area of particularly serious crime
with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of such offences or from
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a special need to combat them on a common basis.Thereafter, this provision sets out a list
of crimes in respect of which the EuropeanUnion shall have legislative competence such as
terrorism, organised crime, andmoney laundering, counterfeiting ofmeans of payment and
computer related crime. It also states that the Council may identify other possible areas of
crime that meet the cross-border and seriousness criteria. Furthermore, art.83(2)
establishes that the possibility exists for approximation of national laws if a measure
proves essential towards ensuring the effective implementation of a Union policy in an
area that has already been subject to harmonisation measures.
Yet despite the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and thereby the extended
competences in EU criminal law, there is no explicit legal basis for the fight against
market abuse in general since the European Union’s competence is limited to specific
areas and is a shared competence (art.4(j) TFEU). Although ’’market abuse’’ is not listed
in art.83(1) TFEU, such misconduct could, however, often be linked to organised crime or,
with some imagination and by overstretching legality, ’’computer related criminality’’ or
’’fraud’’. Nevertheless, as mentioned, the proposed Directive is based on art.83(2) TFEU
and the need to harmonise in order to ensure the effective implementation of a Union area.
Before examining the justificationof the proposedmeasures under scrutiny here, it is useful
briefly to outline the history of the European Union’s fight against market abuse as such.
AMAD history
Market abuse is the umbrella label used to define insider dealing and market manipulation.
The definition of market manipulation is somewhat vague. In short, it may arise in
circumstances where investors have been unreasonably disadvantaged, directly or
indirectly, by others who have used information which is not publicly available to trade in
financial instruments to their advantage (insider dealing), have distorted the price-setting
mechanismof financial instruments, or have disseminated false ormisleading information.13
Similarly to the European Union’s fight against money laundering and the financing of
terrorism, there have been concerns raised about lack of clarity and undermined human
rights standards in this area.14
Consequently, the merits of the existing Market Abuse Directive (MAD) have been
intensely debated.15 The initial MAD was adopted in 2003 and introduced a
comprehensive framework to tackle insider dealing and to boost investor confidence in
the market by prohibiting those who possess inside information from trading in related
financial instruments. The MAD was revolutionary since it addressed market
manipulation and insider dealing in the same measure as market abuse related
misconduct. The ban on insider dealing in modern European law has its roots in the
United States, where the courts developed it based on the general common law
provisions on fraud.16 The debate in connection with the 2003 Directive was centred on
the question of whether the ’’confidence in the market’’ slogan fitted with art.114 TFEU and
how the fight against market abuse could be linked to it. The problem was that the MAD,
according to commentators, was not really aimed at market making as such despite being
based on art.114 TFEU. Hence the prohibition of market abuse aimed to protect market
efficiency in general.17 So the burning issue here has been if market abuse distorts the
market at all.18 Some commentators, such as Ferrarini, pointed out that the Directive was
not ambitious enough as the EU legislator simply stated that the prevention at stake could
notbe sufficiently achievedby theMember States andcould therefore by reasonof its scale
and effects be better achieved at EU level.19 In short, the main source of criticism has been
that there have been shortages in sophisticated arguments as presented by the
European Current Law Issue 10 2012 xi
13 See the vague definition as provided in the Proposal for a Directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and
market manipulation COM(2011) 654 final. See also M. Siems and M. Nelemans, ’’The Reform of the Market
Abuse Law: Revolution or Evolution?’’ (2012) 19MaastrichtJournal of European and Comparative Law195.
14 R. Alexander, Insider Dealing and Money Laundering in the EU: Law and Regulation (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2007), p.145.
15 e.g. N. Moloney, ’’Investor protection and theTreaty’’ in G. Ferrarini et al. (eds), Capital Markets in the Age of the
Euro (The Hague: Kluwer Law, 2003), p.17.
16 E. Engle, ’’Global norm convergence: capital market in US and EU law’’ (2010) 21E.B.L. Rev. 465.
17 G. Ferrarini, ’’TheMarket Abuse Directive’’ (2004) 41C.M.L. Rev. 711.
18 E. Herlin-Karnell, ’’Is there more to it than the fight against Dirty Money? Article 95 and the criminal law’’
(2008) 19 E.B.L. Rev. 558.
19 Ferrarini, ’’TheMarket Abuse Directive’’ (2004) 41C.M.L. Rev. 711.
FOCUS
Commission. As pointed out by Moloney, investor confidence in the marketplace is
notoriously difficult to pin down and the exact losses hard to estimate.20
In any case, as a result of the global economic crises, concerns were raised about the
effectiveness of the MAD and the need to update it in the light of current circumstances.
Clearly, the financial crises appear to be a trigger of policy reforms in this area. The
development of the European Union’s fight against irregularities and criminal activity in
the financial sector should therefore be seen in tandem with the European Union’s
desperate attempts to recover the economy by boosting investor confidence in the EU
market. The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision was set up to strengthen
European supervisory arrangements covering all financial sectors, with the objective of
establishing a more efficient, integrated and sustainable European system of supervision
strengthening European supervisory arrangements covering all financial sectors.21 This
Group recommended that ’’a sound prudential and conduct of business framework for
the financial sector must rest on strong supervisory and sanctioning regimes’’.22 This
recommendation was issued at the same time as the importance of the efficient
functioning of the MAD was underlined by the Commission’s Communication ’’Driving
European recovery’’.23 In this Communication, the Commission referred to the High-
Level Group, which stressed the importance of confidence, which was taken for granted
inwell-functioning financial systems but had been lost in the present crisis.24 Therefore the
reorganisation of this system focused on the importance of the enhancement of market
integrity and investor protectionwhere the reformationof the sanctions systemwas seenas
a crucial part of this strategy.25
In other words, the reform of the market abuse regime forms part of the broader rescue
mission to ’’save Europe’’, where the financial sector and the global economy have been
victims of misconducts within the financial sector.26 For this reason, there is in the view of
the Commission an urgent need to get tough on EUmarket abuse.
The proposed Directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market
manipulation
As explained, the proposal for the Directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and
market manipulation (market abuse) forms part of the general reshuffle spirit in the
European Union in order to increase confidence in the market and thereby boost trust
and increase economic activity. The purpose of the Directive seems to be to move closer
to the objective of a single rulebook.27More specifically, according to the Commission, the
adoption of administrative sanctions in combination with the divergent approaches in the
Member States has proved insufficient. Thus something needs to be done to increase the
effectiveness of the regime and boost investor confidence. Could criminal law offer that
magic solution?
The proposedDirective is based on art.83(2) TFEU, which, as noted, provides for amore
extensive competence than the areas listed in art.83(1) TFEU for the effective
implementation of a Union policy. The proposed Directive states that the MAD system
has proved insufficient, that supervisory authorities must be equipped with sufficient
powers, and that the Member States’ sanctioning regimes are generally regarded as
weak and heterogeneous. According to the Commission, market abuse can be carried
out across borders and this divergence undermines the internal market and leaves a
certain scope for the perpetrators of market abuse to carry out such abuse in
jurisdictions which do not provide for criminal sanctions for a particular offence. The
xii European Current Law Issue 10 2012
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proposed Directive wants to change this by adding criminal law to the discussion and
thereby fighting market abuse more effectively.
Hence the proposed Directive offers a test case on the limits of art.83(2) TFEU, and on
howmuch can slip through this provision and its requirement that harmonisation is needed
since there is not much in contemporary EU law that has not already been the subject of
some kind of harmonisation by the European Union and could therefore not be linked to
the effectiveness criteria as stipulated in this provision. As noted above, art.83(2)
TFEU provides for a broader competence in an area that has already been subject to the
European Union’s harmonisation programme if it were essential for the effective
implementation of a Union policy. Arguably, this paragraph has to be read in the light of
the famous, albeit controversial, Commission v Council (Environmental crimes) ruling
in 2005, where the court held that (environmental) criminal law could be harmonised for
the full effectiveness of EU law in order to ensure effective, proportionate and
dissuasive penalties.28
Nevertheless, the proposed Directive does not rely on classic effectiveness concerns.
Rather, it argues that criminal sanctions to fightmarketmanipulation and insider dealing are
needed as a tool for the smooth functioning of the internal market and, in particular, to
ensure market integrity. Yet the problem is that the Commission does not define market
integrity, though the Directive turns on it. Commonly, the term market integrity is
negatively defined as ’’the extent to which investors engage in prohibited trading
behaviour’’.29 The difficulty is, however, that the absence of abuse does not necessarily
lead to integrity. Still, the need to ensure integrity in the market seems inexorably linked to
the question of confidence in the market.
What is unclear is why the proposal is based on art.83(2) TFEU and not art.114 TFEU
governing the internal market. Although it is true that art.114 TFEU is residual to other
specific legal bases, it could be argued that art.114 TFEU would have been a more
appropriate legal basis here. There is at least one reason for this: an interpretation of
art.83(2) TFEU with no threshold at all in terms of market creation will become an even
lower test than that of art.114 TFEU. This is arguably the case even if the post-Tobacco
Advertising cases30 have similarly confirmed the European preference for ’’when in
doubt legislate’’ by not paying much tribute to the legislative limits as set by theTreaties:
namely conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality. Yet there is a further possible
candidate here, not mentioned by the Commission, namely art.325 TFEU (ex art.280).
This provision stipulates that the Union and the Member States shall counter fraud and
any other illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the Union through measures
to be taken in accordance with this article, which shall act as a deterrent and be such
as to afford effective protection in the Member States, and in all the Union’s institutions,
bodies, offices and agencies. Admittedly, as Mitsilegas points out, it is not clear
whether the Union would have competence under art.325 TFEU to adopt criminal laws
on fraud or whether it would need to have recourse to art.83(2) TFEU also.31 But
likewise, it is not clear why art.325 TFEU is not relevant to the fight against market
abuse. Regardless, the Commission seems to be of the view that art.83(2) TFEU is
sufficient as a sole legal basis even if the measure is aimed at confidence building in the
market.
Of course, from a Member State perspective, there is merit with respect to engaging
art.83(2) TFEU as compared with action taken under art.114 TFEU, in that the former
provision grants the possibility for the Member States to pull an emergency brake if a
proposed measure appears to be too sensitive for the national law criminal law system.
Moreover, use of art.114 or art.325 TFEUwouldmean that the United Kingdom and Ireland
would not be able to ’’cherry-pick’’ the possibility of opt-outs as they otherwise would
regarding legislation within the AFSJ (in accordance with Protocol 21).32 Regardless, it
does not answer the question as to what extent it should be possible to use art.83(2)
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TFEU to legislate for confidence in the market, the merits of the emergency brake
notwithstanding.
Would Article114 TFEU have been a better legal basis?
It could cautiously be asked if the Commission will from now on be able to achieve the
adoptionof legislation relating to the internalmarketmore easily under art.83(2) TFEU than
art.114 TFEU. As explained, the proposed Directive claims to be boosting confidence in the
market and ensuring investor protection, and it uses the same arguments as are usually
applied under art.114 TFEU. The rationale for prohibiting insider dealing and market
manipulation is to prevent market failure.33 Manipulative practices are a form of market
failure, which ultimately leads to an inefficient allocation of resources and damages the
marketplace in capital allocation. In connection with the 2003 MAD, Moloney pointed
out that although that Directive did not directly address the link to the removal of
obstacles to trade or distortion of competition, it was concerned with the integrated
market place against new integration risks. According to Moloney, control of these risks
should, given the particular investor protection andmarket integrity needs of the integrated
investment services and security marketplace, be accommodated within the art.114 TFEU
’’functioning of the market place requirement’’.34 So it could be argued that market abuse
undermines trust in the market. Yet, as explained, the Directive is based on art.83(2) TFEU
not art.114 TFEU.
In addition, it is worth asking if it would be desirable to have a dual legal basis for the
adoption of the Directive or whether such an approachwould lead to a legal basis conflict.
Typically, a dispute of conflicting legal basis has been resolved by recourse to the centre of
gravity test.35 As regards art.114 TFEU, there is however no real centre of gravity test
available, the question resting rather on whether the measure at issue contributes to
market creation at all.36 Consequently, it could be argued that the proposed Directive
could have been based on art.114 TFEU if a sufficiently strong market creation link could
be demonstrated (which, in any event, seems largely absent under art.83(2) TFEU).
Moreover, the market abuse regime has many similarities to theThirdMoney Laundering
Directive,37 in that it aims to create confidence in themarket but does not really explainwhy.
TheThirdMoney LaunderingDirective is basedon art.114 TFEU and involves administrative
sanctions. Interestingly, market abuse forms part of the money laundering framework in
some Member States such as the United Kingdom.38 It remains unclear how the
relationship between these instruments will develop in the future.
The proposed Regulation: competition law through the back door?
The proposed Regulation39 addresses the same area but its regime is stricter than that
proposed by the Directive. Most interestingly, it appears to bring competition law in
through the back door by granting far-reaching surveillance mechanisms and by
introducing so-called (black)listing, discussed below. The proposed Regulation is closely
associated with reform of the so-called MiFD (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive)
and is suggested to enter into force on the date of entry into application of the MiFID
review.40 Hence the proposal follows the Commission’s Communication ’’Ensuring
efficient, safe and sound derivatives markets: Future policy actions’’, where the
Commission undertook to extend relevant provisions of the MAD in order to cover
derivatives markets in a comprehensive fashion.41
As for the legal basis of the proposed Regulation, the Commission states that:
’’There is a need to establish a uniform framework in order to preserve market
integrity and to avoid potential regulatory arbitrage as well as to provide more legal
xiv European Current Law Issue 10 2012
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certainty and less regulatory complexity for market participants.’’42
Hence the justification for the adoption of the Regulation is the same as for the proposed
Directive, albeit with a different legal basis, namely art.114 TFEU. The Regulation aims
expressly at contributing to the smooth functioning of the internal market.
Why, then, the need for this dual approachwithboth aDirective and a Regulation to fight
market abuse? It is true that the use of double procedures follows a similar pattern to that of
anti-money laundering policy, mentioned above (where the main instrument in this area is
the Third Money Laundering Directive,43 also based on art.114 TFEU, which is
complemented by Regulation 1889/200544 concerning the control of cash entering and
leaving the Union) and is intended to supplement theMoney Laundering Directive. So it is
not the first time that the EU legislator has used a dual legal basis approach. It should be
recalled that A.G. Kokott, in her Opinion in the Smoke Flavouring case,45 argued that as
long as ameasuremerely serves as awhole to approximate the laws of theMember States,
it can provide for procedures that do not bring about approximation directly but by multi-
level stages with intermediate steps.46 The court agreed and stated that the authors of the
Treaty intended to confer on the Union legislature a discretion, depending on the general
context and the specific circumstances of the matter to be harmonised, as regards the
harmonisation technique most appropriate for achieving the desired result. Regardless, it
could be argued that this multi-level approach leads to unnecessary complexity and is not,
therefore, in line with the ’’less is more’’^better and smarter regulation^mantra in EU law.
Sanctions: double procedures?
In addition, the proposed Regulation introduces administrative sanctions by stipulating that
financial markets are increasingly integrated in the Union and offences can have cross-
border effects. The existing divergent sanctioning regimes among Member States foster
regulatory arbitrage and impair the ultimate objectives of market integrity and transparency
within the single market for financial services. It could seriously be questioned if dual
regulation through criminal law sanctions and administrative sanctions, as proposed in
the Regulation and the Directive respectively, breaches the principle of ne bis in idem or
double jeopardy, and thereby art.50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Article 50 states
that:
’’No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings for an
offence for which he or she has already been finally acquitted or convicted within
the Union in accordance with the law.’’
Traditionally, the notion of ne bis in idem only applies to criminal law. Yet it could be
argued that such an approach leads to a fundamentally unfair system and that the
proportionality principle has an important role to play here so as to avoid double
procedures. Interestingly, the draft Regulation claims in its Preamble (at Recital 39) that
it respects the principles laid down in the Charter and thereby also ne bis in idem with
regard to sanctions in the Regulation, but nothing is said as regards the relationship
between the proposed Directive and the Regulation in this regard. It is to be hoped that
the principle of proportionality will play a key role here in order to avoid double
sanctions.
Indeed, as oneAdvocate General recently expressed it in the pending case of —kerberg
Fransson concerning the compatibility of the Swedish tax system with the imposition
of non-penal sanctions against tax fraud,
’’the principle of proportionality and, in any event, the principle of the prohibition of
arbitrariness, as derived from the rule of law which results from the common
constitutional traditions of the Member States, precludes a criminal court from
European Current Law Issue 10 2012 xv
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exercising jurisdiction in a way which completely disregards the fact that the facts
before it have already been the subject of an administrative penalty.’’47
So theAdvocate General put his trust in the notion of proportionality as an extra safeguard
against double procedures.
Market abuse raids?
Afurthermatter of interest put on the table by theRegulation is theproposed regime for so-
called ’’blacklisting’’ through the publication of sanctions and by allowing competent
authorities far-reaching powers similar to those of competition law raids and anti-
terrorism measures. It could be argued that the Regulation brings us very close to the
area of competition law, by imposing (as outlined in arts 1215 of the Regulation) an
obligation on issuers of financial instruments to issue so-called listing of companies or
individuals engaged in market abuse. Furthermore, it authorises and empowers
competent authorities, required to be set up by the Member States (art.16) for the
purposes of the Regulation, to access telephone and existing data traffic records held by
a telecommunications operator or by an investment firm. Accordingly, competent
authorities should be able to require these records where a reasonable suspicion of
market abuse exists. Competent authorities are furthermore required to report suspicious
activity, something that has been highly controversial in connection with theThird Money
Laundering Directive, which introduced this mechanism in line with a risk-based
approach.48 In that context with respect to money laundering, private actors, such as
lawyers and banks, are expected to make risk assessments of their customers and divide
them into low-risk andhigh-risk categories.49 The rationale for actively engaging theprivate
sector in the anti-money laundering process is to make these actors collect the appropriate
information. The reference to a risk-based approach is, however, absent in the MAD
context. But it could be argued that this is what is really at stake here. Risk would then
be taken as meaning the development of a preventive approach to the area of crime. And
’’preventive’’ would be taken as meaning: it is better to legislate before it is too late to save
Europe from the current financial turmoil.
Delicate questions raised by the Directive and the Regulation
It appears as if the Commission has kept the cake and eaten it by using two different
legislative measures to regulate the same issue, albeit through different means. Yet the
critical concepts of market manipulation and insider dealing are not defined in the same
way in the Directive and the Regulation respectively, and this might be problematic. The
definition in the Regulation is far more complex as compared with the Directive, and it is
much longer. It covers a broader area as compared to the current regime under the MAD
also to include information that has not been disclosed yet but can still be abused (such as
the conditions under which financial instruments will be marketed). The proposed
Regulation also states that the increased trading of instruments across different venues
makes it more difficult to monitor for possible market abuse. The following sections will
address some of the likely controversies that will be generated if both measures are
adopted as proposed.
What kind of sanctions?
In the Ship-Source Pollution case, the court of Justice held that the level of criminal law
sanctions should be left to theMember States.50 Nonetheless, this approach appears now
revised by the proposed Directive. Accordingly, the Commission states that:
’’Minimum rules on criminal offences and on criminal sanctions for market abuse,
which would be transposed into national criminal law and applied by the criminal
justice systems of the Member States, can contribute to ensuring the effectiveness
of this Union policy by demonstrating social disapproval of a qualitatively different
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nature compared to administrative sanctions or compensation mechanisms under
civil law. Criminal convictions for market abuse offences, which often result in
widespread media coverage, help to improve deterrence as they demonstrate to
potential offenders that the authorities take serious enforcement action which can
result in imprisonment or other criminal sanctions and a criminal record.’’51
This appears to indicate a high minimum level for the relevant penalties.
The Commission’s Communication on reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial
sector is particularly intriguing in this context.52 It is stated there that efficient and
sufficiently convergent sanctioning regimes are the necessary corollary to the new
supervisory system and that:
’’Supervision cannot be effective with weak, highly variant sanctioning regimes. It is
essential that within the EU and elsewhere, all supervisors are able to deploy
sanctioning regimes that are sufficiently convergent, strict, resulting in deterrence.’’
Nonetheless, nothing is said about the type of sanctions to be adopted. Regardless, in the
proposed Directive, the Commission argues that criminal sanctions, in particular
imprisonment, are generally considered to send a strong message of disapproval that
could increase the dissuasiveness of sanctions, provided that they are appropriately
applied by the criminal justice system.53 However, in the Communication on reinforcing
sanctioning regimes in the financial sector, the Commission also stated that criminal
sanctions may not be appropriate for all types of violations. Moreover, it stated that it
would assess whether and in which areas the introduction of criminal sanctions, and the
establishment of minimum rules on the definition of criminal offences and sanctions, may
prove tobe essential inorder to ensure the effective implementationof EU financial services
legislation. This is unfortunately not the case in the Directive.
Attempts
Both instruments cover attempted manipulation and attempted insider dealing. The
proposed Regulation provides in arts 7 and 8 that attempting to engage in insider
dealing or market manipulation is prohibited, while the Directive simply states (in arts 3
and 4) that an attempt to engage in market manipulation or insider dealing shall be
prohibited. It is difficult to see how attempts should be part of the Regulation too when
that measure concerns administrative sanctions. After all, where do you draw the line for
attempts here as regards when an attempt is started? It should be noted that the law on
attempts is controversial in criminal law more generally and under ongoing debate as
regards how much subjectivity can be brought into criminal law. Certainly, the law of
attempts is fascinating, also from a normative point of view with the so-called subjective
versus objective theory debate. According to the latter theory, attempts are ’’punished’’only
if they constitute a possible attempt, i.e. a feasible crime. Conversely, according to the
subjective theory, an attempt can be punished even if the attempt was an impossible
attempt, i.e. impossible to carry out, but where the offender thought that he or she was
committing a crime.54
So will we see a new European law on attempts emerging? Neither the Regulation nor
the Directive offers any clarification as regards the boundaries of attempt. In an
oversimplified way, both instruments state that no one shall attempt to engage in market
abuse. At best this will mean that it is left to the Member States to use their own national
systems as regards how to delineate attempted market abuse; at worst it will lead to
divergence in the application of the measures and the Commission will soon ’’attempt’’
to issue its own theory on how to view attempts within the scope of EU criminal law. As
pointed out by Peers, however, the court has already ruled in Ebony Maritime55 that to
ensure the ’’effective prevention’’ of breaches of EC sanctions against former Yugoslavia
extended the European regime to cover attempts also.56 Moreover the PIF convention57
in connection with fraud against the EU budget included incomplete offences within its
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scope, which arguably confirms the existence of the subjective theory in EU criminal
law.
Criminal liability for legal persons
The proposed Directive imposes criminal liability on legal persons.The problem is that that
not allMember States recognise criminal liability for legalpersons, but it has beenobserved
that there are a number of examples in secondary legislation already whereMember States
are required to impose penalties on both natural and legal persons.58 Interestingly, the
proposal for a Directive on sanctions against employers of illegally resident third-country
nationals, based on ex art.63(3)(b) EC, also provides for the obligation to impose criminal
sanctions on natural and legal employers.59 There are, however, differences between the
Member States when it comes to the issue of criminal liability for legal persons. Suffice it to
say in the present context that EUlawusually recognises this tension andhence leaves it to
the Member States to decide what sanctions to impose. The Court has so far recognised
this sensitivity by stating that the Member States are free to choose whether to enforce
liability on legal persons as long as effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions are
imposed on someone.60 The proposed Directive ignores this sensitive question by simply
requiring that there be effective criminal law sanctions against legal persons.Therefore it is
reasonable to believe that those Member States who do not recognise such liability at
present will have to adapt their systems in the light of the changing EU approach.61
Data protection and fundamental rights
Adequate protection of personal data and applicable human rights standards offer further
delicate questions. The proposed Regulation imposes a very far-reaching supervisory
regime by stating that telephone and data traffic records from telecom operators
constitute crucial (and sometimes the only) evidence to detect and prove the existence
of market abuse. Yet this seems contradictory in the light of the changes brought by the
LisbonTreaty and the Stockholm Programme. For example, the question of data protection
in the criminal law context plays a central role in the Stockholm Programme, where it is
repeatedly stressed that the framework for data protection needs to be strengthened.The
most important change from Lisbon in this regard is the inclusion of art.16 TFEU. That
provision not only contains an individual right for the data subject to the protection of
his or her personal data, but it also obliges the European Parliament and Council to
provide for data protection in all areas of European Union law.62 Article 16 TFEU mirrors
art.8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which also proclaims the right to data
protection. In addition, Declaration 21 attached to the Lisbon Treaty states that specific
rules on the protection of personal data and the free movement of such data in the fields
of judicial co-operation in criminal matters and police co-operation based on art.16 TFEU
may prove necessary because of the specific nature of these fields.
More generally, the prevention of crime in the European Union offers an example of
security issues put to the test in the context of the protection of human rights and
personal data.63 Recently, the Commission proposed a Directive on the protection of
personal data processed for the purposes of prevention, detection, investigation or
prosecution of criminal offences and related judicial activities.64 This Directive sets out a
far-reaching requirement for the Member States to observe and respect personal data, as
well as rules for how to collect such data and rules relating to processing of personal data
for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences
or the execution of criminal offences. The scope of the Directive is not limited to cross-
border data processing but applies to all processing activities carried out by ’’competent
authorities’’. It is tentatively suggested that the proposedmarket abuse Regulation conflicts
with theproposedDirective or at least does not consider its requirements in sufficient detail.
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This brings us to a closely associated question, namely that of proportionality.
Breach of proportionality?
In the proposed Regulation, the Commission points out that the Charter of Fundamental
Rights establishes some important exceptions in art.52 to the application of the rights
granted by the Charter and, as such, the right to privacy and to an effective remedy.
Article 52 makes it clear that:
’’Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized by this Charter
must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms.
Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are
necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognized by the Union
or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.’’
So under the Charter, unlike the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), the
general ’’limitation clause’’ in art.52 and its proportionality test applies to all rights.65 For
this reason, the Commission argues that access to data and telephone records is necessary
to provide evidence and investigative leads on possible insider dealing or market
manipulation, and therefore for the detection and sanctioning of market abuse.
There are two dangers here. First, there is a risk that what will emerge in this area is
something similar to a margin of appreciation test as developed in the ECHR case law66
and that the proportionality test as set out in art.52 might ’’lose out’’ too easily unless
strictly applied. Secondly, the Commission seems to forget the existence of art.49 of the
Charter, which stipulates that the severity of penalties appliedmust not be disproportionate
to the criminal offence. It is argued that it should be very difficult to derogate from the right
to a proportionate penalty as stipulated in art.49 of the Charter as it sets out a different kind
of proportionality not really encompassed by art.52. Although it is true that the Regulation
does not deal with ’’criminal law’’ sanctions, the effect of these sanctions comes very close
to that of criminal law and should be regarded as criminal law following the classic Engel
criteria. According to these criteria, there should be an autonomous interpretation of
sanctions and the consequences of the sanction in question should form the guiding
dictum for how to conceptualise it.67 Therefore it could be argued that the proposed
Regulation breaches proportionality requirements and that art.49 of the Charter should
apply also to the sanctions prescribed in the Regulation.68
The Commission’s vision for a coherent and consistent EU criminal policy
The proposed Directive for criminal law sanctions against market abuse needs to be read in
the light of the Commission’s recent communications on EU criminal policy. This
Communication, ’’Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation
of EU policies through criminal law’’, is particularly interesting as it offers a concrete
example in the sphere of EU criminal law of a nuanced debate in the EU’s institutions.69
This Communication explicitly mentions not only the need to develop a coherent systemof
EUcriminalpolicy, but alsohighlights the concerns of EUcitizens. Part of the justification for
this Communication is, therefore, the added value of EUcriminal law, in linewith thewishes
of the EU citizens. Indeed, a recent Eurobarometer70 places the fight against crime high in
the EU chart-list of what the citizens want to the European Union to tackle effectively. As
such, it was ranked fourth after concerns about fixing the debt crises, immigration policy
and health policy.71
In any case, the Commission points out that:
’’While EU criminal law measures can play an important role as a complement to the
national criminal law systems, it is clear that criminal law reflects the basic values,
European Current Law Issue 10 2012 xix
65 S. Douglas-Scott, ’’The EU and Human Rights after theTreaty of Lisbon’’ (2011) 11Human Rights Law Review
645.
66 On the margin of appreciation test, see, e.g. M.R. Hutchinson, ’’The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Eur-
opean Court of Human Rights’’ (1999) 48 International and Comparative LawQuarterly 638, 645.
67
Engel v Netherlands (A/22) (1979-80) 1E.H.R.R. 647 ECtHR.
68 For a recent strict interpretation of the ’’Engel test’’, see Criminal proceedings against Bonda (C-489/10) June
5, 2012, confirming previous case law, e.g. Kaserei Champignon Hofmeister v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas (C-
210/00) [2002] E.C.R. I-6453 that administrative sanctions are of a non-criminal law nature.
69 COM(2011) 573 final.
70 Eurobarometer 75 (Spring 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb75/eb75_en.htm [Accessed
July 5, 2012].
71 Discussed in E. Herlin-Karnell, ’’Is the citizen driving the EU’s criminal law agenda?’’ in M. Dougan, N. Nic
Shuibhne and E. Spaventa (eds), Empowerment and Disempowerment of the European Citizen (Oxford: Hart Pub-
lishing, 2012), Ch.9.
FOCUS
customs and choices of any given society.’’72
For this reason, the Commission emphasises that it is particularly important to ensure that
EU legislation on criminal law, in order to have a real added value^and to be subsidiarity
compliant^is consistent and coherent. The question is just what that means. After all, if
’’consistent and coherent’’ is always taken to mean ’’more EU legislation’’, then the added
value of the Communication is less impressive if the European Union also wants to
recognise national identity as promised in the Communication and therefore to respect
the principle of subsidiarity. After all, much EU legislation in EU criminal law in general
has so far been characterised by ’’rush’’ and the need to deal with or respond to specific
risks and threats.
The Commission concludes by stating that there should be a common understanding of
the guiding principles underlying EU criminal law legislation; such as the interpretation of
basic legal concepts used in EU criminal law, and how criminal law sanctions can provide
most added value at EU level. If this is seriously embraced in practice, then that is
undoubtedly a very welcome development. It is difficult, however, to see how the
market abuse initiatives live up to this objective.
In any case, the impact assessment accompanying the proposed instruments on market
abuse offers a further intriguing example of amore ambitious approachby the Commission
to the enterprise of EU criminal law policies.73 The Commission stipulates that there is a
considerable divergence among theMember States and that it is important that regulation
keeps pacewithmarket developments.Yet, although the actual impact assessment and the
Commission’s Communication on the coherence and effectiveness of EU law offer a
remarkable example of a more nuanced approach to EU criminal policy in general, it is
argued that it is not reflected in the market abuse initiatives to the desired extent. This
appears to be the case even though the impact assessment attached to the proposed
Directive and the proposed Regulation provides an impressive example of better
regulation in theAFSJ sphere.
Conclusion
The reform of the market abuse regime should be seen in the light of the reconstruction of
the rest of this policy area. It represents an attempt to solve the current financial crises by
using the criminal law to boost investor confidence.
In addition, it offers a first example of use of art.83(2) TFEU and confirms the wide-
ranging scope of the provision. This article has argued that the new Directive on criminal
law sanctions against market abuse should not have beenbased on art.83(2) TFEUbut on
art.114 TFEU and art.325 TFEU, possibly in conjunction with art.83(2) TFEU. But most
importantly, there is no compelling reason for having a Directive and a Regulation
regulating the same area. The fight against market abuse is about regulating market
failure. If art.83(2) will be used as a short-cut for market creation in the future then there
is a reason to be worried. In addition, it is highly debatable whether insider dealing is better
fought through criminal law.There is anethical dimensionhere that needs tobe discussed. If
it is acceptable that naming and shaming companies will lead to better convergence
through administrative sanctions, as suggested in the Regulation, then why is it also
necessary to add criminal law to the picture? It is tentatively suggested that the
Commission neglected to consider its own promise in its Communication ’’Towards an
EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies through criminal
law’’, that subsidiarity and consistency play an increasingly important role with respect to
legislation adopted within theAFSJ.
Finally, theproposedRegulation raises important issues as regardshowmuchprevention
can be achieved through the enactment of administrative sanctions. Ideally, the
Commission would redraft its proposed legislation to include a better explanation as to
why banning market manipulation drives and recovers the European market, and why it
needs to be done through double procedures.
So while the European Union is getting tough onwhite-collar crime and aims for greater
market integrity, that very integrity seems still largely in the making.
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